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英語動詞 make の意味的拡張について

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〈キーワード〉
① make　②動作主　③被動作主　④計画　⑤変化

〈論文要旨〉
英語動詞 make は、英語学習者にとって基本的な動詞であり、“They *made* their flat into a beautiful home,” においては「あるものを別のものに変える」、“The smoke *made* him cough,” においては「誰かにあることをさせたり感じさせたりする」というのが *make* の意味とされる。
本論文では、⑴動作主と被動作主が存在する。⑵動作主は意図を持つ。⑶動作主は被動作主に接触する。⑷変化の結果は物理的である。などの SVO 構文に共通して存在するとされる特徴をもとに make の意味的拡張を分析する。この結果が、英語学習や教育に貢献することが期待される。

On the Semantic Extension of the English Verb *Make*

Yoshikazu OKA

〈Key words〉
① make　② agent　③ patient　④ plan　⑤ change

〈Abstract〉
The English verb *make* has many usages and meanings. In “They *made* their flat into a beautiful home,” *make* means ‘to change something so that it becomes a different thing,’ while in “The smoke *made* him cough,” *make* means ‘to cause someone to do or feel something.’
I attempt to examine whether meanings and usages of *make* have some coherent semantic features on the basis of the properties which sentences with SVO construction have：⑴ There is a single specific agent and a single specific patient. ⑵ The agent has a “plan.” ⑶ The agent touches the patient either with his body or an instrument. ⑷ The change of state is physical., and others.
I hope that the attempt made in this paper will contribute to teaching and learning basic English verbs.

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Introduction

The English verb *make* has many usages and meanings. In "They *made* their flat into a beautiful home," *make* means 'to change something so that it becomes a different thing,' while in "The smoke made him cough," *make* means 'to cause someone to do or feel something.'

I attempt to examine whether meanings and usages of *make* have some coherent semantic features on the basis of the properties which sentences with SVO construction have: (1) There is a single specific agent and a single specific patient. (2) The agent has a "plan," (3) The agent touches the patient either with his body or an instrument, (4) The change of state is physical., and others.

I hope that the attempt made in this paper will contribute to teaching and learning basic English verbs.

1. The semantic nature of *make*

When the agent makes something, he makes some effort to do so, which will be clear by comparing *take* with *make*.

(1) Quite nervously, I *made my way* to the edge.

Horowitz (2016: 42)

(2) Spotting a flash of colour among the gloom, I wade towards it, coming upon a red handkerchief hammered to a tree.... Stumbling between them, I *make my way* through the murk until I reach the edge of the forest,...

Turton (2018: 6)

(3) I collect my coat and umbrella from my bedroom and *make my way* outside where rain is bouncing off the ground....

Turton (2018: 37)

In (1), the person climbed to the top of the tower from which a novelist took his life by falling down. The place was scaring with no easy route to the edge of the fence of the tower. In (2), the person is trying to get out of the forest with the help of red handkerchiefs. There is no route to lead him out of the forest. The semantic features of *make* will be clear by comparing *make one's way* with *take a route/path /way*.

(4) Many foolish girls *took the wrong path*.
(5) I *took* a way to the station.

One needs little effort in *taking a path/way* since it lies before him/her.

Another expression with *make* is about going on a trip.

(6) He *took* a trip.
(7) He *made* a trip.

In (6), it is implied that he took a trip for fun, while in (7) he made a trip, say, for business. One needs some effort to do business successfully. English distinguishes *make* from *take* as to whether some 'effort' is needed or not.

Ferdinand de Saussure states that the thought itself is only a mass of indistinct nebla and that it is language (a set of words) which forms concepts:

(8) Psychologiquement, abstraction faite de son expression par les mots, notre penscée n'est qu'une masse amorphe et indistincte. Philosophes et linguistes se sent toujours accordés à reconnaître que, sans le secours des signes, nous serions incapables de distinguer deux idées d'une façon claire et constante. Prise en elle-même, la pensée est comme une nébuleuse où rien n'est nécessairement delimit. Il n'y a pas d'idees préétablies, et rien n'est distinct avant l'apparition de la langue.

Saussure (1916: 155)

Saussure maintains that language and idea, in other words an expression and its content, are not separable, and that words form concepts in an arbitrary way. Sentences with *take* and *make* show no difference in terms of the state of affairs because we see the identical event when someone is going through a field. The difference lies only on the part of the agent depending on whether the person (agent) regards his behavior of proceeding as taking a path or making a path. It is, therefore, impossible to draw the objective line between *take* and *make*.

The basic semantic feature of *make* is as follows.

(9) The agent uses some physical power to change a given material (patient) into a product.

The following is an excerpt from an essay written by Hearn.

⑽ The rules for *making* a Yuki-Daruma are ancient and simple. You first compose[1] a huge snowball—between three and four feet in diameter, if possible—which is to represent the squatting body of Daruma. Then you *make* a smaller snowball, about two feet in diameter, to represent his head; and you put this smaller ball on top of the other—packing snow around the under-parts of both, so as to fix them in place. Two round lumps of charcoal serve to *make*[2] eyes for Daruma;

Hearn（1900: 381）

⑽ describes the procedure for making a Yuki-Daruma, including some sentences with *make*. The agent changes snow into a Yuki-Daruma using his hands.

Infants develop the basic concepts represented by SVO sentence construction by interacting with physical objects around them. The following conditions are the properties of the concept of the sentence construction.

⑾ The agent has as a goal some change of state in the patient.
⑿ The change of state is physical.
⒀ The agent has a "plan" for carrying out this goal[3].
⒁ The plan requires the agent's use of a motor program.
⒂ The agent is in control of that motor program.
⒃ The agent is primarily responsible for carrying out the plan.
⒄ The agent is the energy source（i.e., the agent is directing his energies toward the patient）, and the patient is the energy goal（i.e., the change in the patient is due to an external source of energy）.
⒅ The agent touches the patient either with his body or an instrument（i.e., there is a spatiotemporal overlap between what the agent does and the change in the patient）.
⒆ The agent successfully carries out the plan.
⒇ The change in the patient is perceptible.
(21) The agent monitors the change in the patient through sensory perception.
(22) There is a single specific agent and a single specific patient.

Lakoff（1980: 70-71）

It is worthwhile to examine whether sentences with *make* such as (23) and (24) which are often found in dictionaries meet the conditions mentioned in ⑾－(22).

(23) He *made* a desk *out of* wood.
(24) Wine is *made from* grapes.

While (23) implies that the agent works on the patient with the result of changing it (material) to some substantial product by usually using some tools as well as his own hands, (24) describes the event where the agent picks up grapes, puts them into a cask, and after that microbes change grapes into wine. Comparing (23) with (24) shows that sentences with *make* describe different events.

Wittgenstein's theory on 'family resemblance' on "game" is suggestive. We classify various kinds of events under "game"; chess, card play, baseball and so on. Considering the features that are common to these events, there are some common features between chess and card play.

When considering common features shared by chess and pool, some common features perceived with chess and card play would be retained in chess and pool. With baseball and chess, there exist other common features than those perceived with chess and card play. It is worthwhile to examine whether such features as "amusement", "winning and losing", "competition" are shared with these games. In baseball, one team wins over another, while in the case where a child throws a ball at the wall and catches it, this feature will disappear.

Consider how one's skill and luck will affect games, or how the skill required in playing tennis is different from that in playing chess. In the case of mass game, the feature "amusing" would be held, but other features would disappear. Considering the existing features among "games," we will find some features are held, others are not.

Those considerations made above show that we see complicated nodes of common features consisting of rough common features and minute common features. Thus, to the question of finding some features which enable us to discriminate games from non-games, Wittgenstein gives a negative answer.

(25) What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. But you might be able to draw one; for none has so far been drawn.

Wittgenstein (1967: 33)

(26) and (27) show that the meanings of the verb *stop* are not identical in terms of the state of affairs which each sentence describes.

(26) The policeman *stopped* the car.
(27) The Superman *stopped* the car.

In (26) the policeman raised his hand to the driver and the car came to a halt near the policeman, while in (27) the Superman prevented the car running out of control from falling down to the bottom of the canyon.

2. The notion of changing a material into a product

We will start our discussion with the assumption that the notion 'change' cited in (11) in Section 1 is the common feature shared by sentences with *make* as snow, wood, and grapes change into a yuki-daruma, a desk and wine, respectively. This is not necessarily the case with sentences of SVOC construction with *make* as in (1).

(1) He *made* his son an engineer.

While wood and grapes are not called wood or grape any longer once they are made into a desk or wine, his son is still his son after he becomes an engineer.

(2) a. He *made* a desk
    b. He *changed* wood *into* a desk.
    c. The desk is not wood any longer.
(3) a. He *made* wine.
    b. He *changed* grapes *into* wine.
    c. The wine is not grapes any longer.
(4) a. He *made* his son an engineer.
    b. He *changed* his son *to* an engineer.
    c. *The engineer is not his son any longer.

The definition of *change* is as follows:

(5) **become different**
    Susan has *changed* a lot since I last saw her.
(6) **to make something or someone different**
    Having a baby *changes* your life completely.

(s.v. change v. LDCE)

SVOC construction sentences with *make* do not imply 'change,' in contrast with (5) and (6), which entail (7) and (8) respectively.

(7) Susan is no longer what she was when I saw her last time.
(8) Your life after having a baby is no longer your life before having a baby.

We will study other conditions that events which are represented by *make* are supposed to meet. First of all, we will start with the following one.

(9) There is a single specific agent and a single specific patient. (= (22) in Section 1)

While substantial agents can be identified, there are no physical patients (products or materials) in (10) and (11).

(10) Takashi could *make* sense of what his wife said.
(11) James *made* a funny joke on the singer who made a poor performance at the concert.

Therefore, sentences (10) and (11) do not meet the conditions (12) and (18) in Section 1.

(12) The change of state is physical. (= (12) in Section 1)
(13) The agent touches the patient either with his body or an instrument. (= (18) in Section 1)

This problem will be solved in the following way: Changing physical materials into physical products is applied to describe abstract events.

(14) Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Once we can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them.

Lakoff (1980: 25)

The ontological metaphor is introduced as one of the most basic metaphors to see non-physical things as being substantive.

(15) ...our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinary wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances.

Lakoff (1980: 25)

A non-physical object is treated as if it were a physical substance and functions as a grammatical object of *make*.

(16) Anyway, that was how I spent Sunday afternoon, leafing through the manuscript, *making notes* and really getting nowhere.

Horowitz (2016: 10)

The protagonist uses the manuscript as a material to make notes though she cannot touch or physically manipulate it.

We will examine such a sentence as,

⑰ Takashi could *make sense of* what his wife said.

According to the ontological metaphor, the agent Takashi used what his wife said and noticed her intention, which is represented as he *made sense*. Both sense and what his wife said are non-physical since we cannot touch none of them.

⑱ Charles does have a strange sense of humor. I've often seen him chuckling at jokes that nobody in the room is aware that he's *made*.

Horowitz（2016: 5）

The phrase *make a joke* is based on the idea that someone uses some anecdotes and topics as a material to say something funny.

The ontological metaphor is projected onto the process of finding a criminal.

⑲ '...What do you think?' There was a silence. 'As yet,' said Poirot at last, 'I think nothing. I *collect* only *the impressions*. What Caroline Crale was like. What Amyas Crale was like. What the other people who were there at the time were like. What happened exactly on those two days. *That* is what I need. To go over the facts laboriously *one by one*.

Christie（1942: 105-106）

Impressions are seen as substantial materials which Poirot collects one by one. We find sentences with *make* which do not have any materials though the product, i.e., a beautiful melody, appears.

⑳ a . He *made* a beautiful melody.
b . He *made* a beautiful melody *with* his piano.
c . *He *made* his piano *into* a beautiful melody.
d . *His piano *changed into* a beautiful melody.

㉑ a . He *made* a sweet cake.
b . He *made* a sweet cake *with* flour.

c . He *made* flour *into* a sweet cake.
d . Flour *changed into* a sweet cake.

As his piano is supposed to be an instrument rather than a material to produce a beautiful melody, what is used as a material to produce a product remains unclear.

We will then examine the following text.

(22) The service was not held at the appointed time: it must have been nearly three o'clock when the priests *made their appearance*. ... Priests and acolytes took their places under the blue awning; ...

Hearn (1900: 362)

(22) shows the point of our forthcoming discussion.

(23) a . He made his appearance.
b . He appeared.

(23 a.) can be paraphrased to (23 b.). The point is that *appear* is an intransitive verb, whereas nominalized verbs in *make* + *nominalized verb* construction[4] are generally transitive verbs as in (24) – (29) .

(24) a . He *made a decision* to buy the very expensive diamond ring.
b . He *decided* to buy the very expensive diamond ring.
(25) a . He *made a proposal* that she buy the very expensive diamond ring.
b . He *proposed* that she buy the very expensive diamond ring.
(26) a . He *made an attempt* to win the first prize.
b . He *attempted* to win the first prize.
(27) a . He *made a reservation* for a room.
b . He *reserved* a room.
(28) a . He *made a progress* in English conversation.
b . He *progressed* in English conversation.
(29) a . He *made a pause* in his lecture.
b . He *paused* in his lecture.

Although (28) and (29) apparently seem to have intransitive verbs, some innate objects are linguistically provided to them in the sense that he made something go ahead and he made

something stop respectively.

It is worthwhile to compare Japanese with English as to how intransitive verbs are used as nominalized verbs after *make* and *take*.

(30) a . He *made* his *appearance*.
b . He *appeared*.
c . Kare-wa-sugata-wo-arawasi-ta.
d . Kare-wa-araware-ta

(31) a . He *took* a nod.
b . He *nodded*.
c . Kare-wa-utatane-wo-shi-ta.
d . Kare-wa-utataneshi-ta.

(30 c.) and (31 c.) suggest that even if any grammatical object of *make/take* does not appear after *appear* and *nod*, linguistic objects can be provided in Japanese, represented by sugata-*wo* and utatane-*wo*.

The expression 'make one's appearance,' on the other hand, does not meet (22) in Section 1.

(32) There is a single specific agent and a single specific patient. (= (22) in Section 1)

The agent and the patient are not separable in sugata-*wo-arawasu* and utatane-*wo-suru*[5].

Concluding remarks

We have attempted to show how sentences with *make* extend semantic properties, and conclude that it is impossible to predict the process of semantic extension, on the basis of Wittgenstein's proposition of 'family resemblance' which stresses that no coherent properties lie in all the usages of a given expression.

The conclusion to which we have reached, however, does not contradict to the investigations made in cognitive semantics since the theory attempts to trace and describe the process as to how a given expression is related with other ones, with no intention of proposing and predicting any coherent and consistent properties among those expressions.

Notes

1 . *Compose* is synonymous with *make* in this sentence, and changeable to *make* in this text, though *make* is more extensive than *compose* in terms of meaning.

2 . *Make* is used synonymously with *represent* here with nothing undergoing any physical change.

3 . As to the plan or intention on the part of the agent to carry out something, (1) and (2) do not meet (13) in Section 1.

(1) He *made a lost* of $ 1000.

(2) He *made a mistake* in filling out the form.

It is strange that the agent plans/intends to do something which he does not desire to happen.

4 . First, it is plausible that *make* has little or no meaning by itself since main verbs convey the intended meaning in *make* + *nominalized verb*. Second, it is not necessarily the case when we compare *take* + *nominalized verb* with *make* + *nominalized verb* as discussed in Section 1.

5 . The expression *make sound* takes the place between *make* + *substantial patient* and *make* + *nominalized verb* regarding the separability of the patient from the agent in the sense that crickets use their own bodies to produce sound as in (3) and (4) .

(3) Crickets *make* a beautiful *sound* in autumn.

(4) Crickets *sound* beautifully in autumn.

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